The U.S. seizure of an oil tanker off the Venezuelan coast appears designed to further squeeze the economy of President Nicolás Maduro’s government. The Dec. 10, 2025 operation — in which American forces descended from helicopters onto the vessel — followed months of U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean and was immediately condemned by Venezuela as “barefaced robbery and an act of international piracy.”
The seized tanker, according to reports, is a 20-year-old supertanker called Skipper, capable of carrying around 2 million barrels of oil.
According to the Trump administration, the vessel was heading to Cuba. Given its size, however, it is far more likely that the final destination was China. Tankers of this scale are rarely used for short Caribbean routes; much smaller vessels typically serve Cuba.
The tanker had been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury in 2022 for carrying prohibited Iranian oil. At the time, it was alleged that the ship — then known as Adisa — was controlled by Russian oil magnate Viktor Artemov and linked to an oil smuggling network.
On the surface, the seizure was unrelated to U.S. sanctions imposed on Venezuela in 2019 and expanded in 2020 to include secondary sanctions on third parties doing business with Caracas.
Venezuelan officials have therefore described the move as unprecedented, and they are largely correct. While Iranian tankers have been seized in the past for sanctions violations, this marks the first time a vessel departing Venezuela with a Venezuelan crew has been taken.
The Trump administration has signaled it intends to seize not only the cargo but the ship itself — a significant loss for the owning company. Because the shipment was sold under a “Free on Board” contract, the buyer assumed responsibility once the vessel left Venezuelan waters.
Nonetheless, the seizure represents a clear escalation in pressure on Venezuela. Reports indicate that around 30 other tankers operating near the country face some form of sanction. These vessels are part of a shadow fleet designed to evade restrictions while transporting oil from Venezuela, Russia, and Iran.
The message from Washington is unambiguous: more seizures may follow as the U.S. seeks to further squeeze Venezuelan oil revenues.
Venezuela’s economy remains overwhelmingly dependent on oil. Although official figures have not been published for seven years, most analysts estimate that oil accounts for more than 80% of exports, with some placing the figure above 90%.
Most Venezuelan oil is sold on the black market, largely to independent refiners in China. Chinese state-owned firms avoid these purchases to limit sanctions exposure, while authorities in Beijing tend to overlook shipments to non-state entities — particularly when tankers conceal their true origin.
An estimated 80% of Venezuelan oil ultimately goes to China through this channel. About 17% is exported to the United States under a Treasury license granted to Chevron, while roughly 3% goes to Cuba, often on subsidized terms.
Oil also accounts for around 20% of Venezuela’s GDP and more than half of government revenue, making the sector indispensable to Maduro’s survival.
Crucially, Venezuela’s oil industry was already in steep decline before U.S. sanctions began. Production peaked at 3.4 million barrels per day in 1998, fell to 2.7 million by the time Maduro took office in 2013, and dropped to 1.3 million barrels per day by 2019.
The 2019 oil sanctions shut Venezuela out of the U.S. market, forcing it to rely more heavily on China and India. When secondary sanctions followed in 2020, Europe and India halted purchases altogether. Combined with the pandemic-driven oil slump, production collapsed to just 400,000 barrels per day.
Output has since recovered to about 1 million barrels per day, aided largely by Chevron’s continued operations.
To sustain exports, Venezuela relies on a shadow fleet that uses false flags, renamed vessels, and manipulated transponders. Cargoes are sometimes transferred at sea — posing major environmental risks — before being relabeled in transit hubs such as Malaysia and shipped on to China.
The tanker seizure had little immediate impact on global oil prices due to ample supply and Venezuela’s limited market share. However, a more aggressive U.S. campaign could change that calculus.
For Venezuelan oil prices, the consequences may be sharper. Already heavily discounted due to sanctions risk, Venezuelan crude is now likely to be sold at even steeper reductions. Buyers will demand higher discounts and fewer prepayments, while export volumes may fall, forcing production cuts that are costly to reverse.
The result will be further pressure on the limited revenues Maduro depends on to keep the Venezuelan state afloat.
About the author:
Francisco J. Monaldi, Ph.D., is the Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Latin American Energy Policy and director of the Latin America Energy Program at the Center for Energy Studies at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.
This article is reproduced from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence
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